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PROPERTY LAW-Property Owners in Condemnation
Actions May Receive Compensation for Diminution in
Value to Their Property Caused by Public Perception:
City of Santa Fe v. Komis
I.

INTRODUCTION

In City of Santa Fe v. Komis,I the New Mexico Supreme Court decided
an issue of first impression: whether, in a partial condemnation action,
a property owner is entitled to receive compensation for the diminution
2
in value to his property caused by public perception or fear. The court
held that a loss in value caused by such fear is compensable, even when
3
the reasonableness of that fear is not shown . This Note discusses the
ways in which other jurisdictions have approached the issue, the evidentiary ramifications of the Komis decision, and the consequences of
the court's decision to condemnation proceedings in New Mexico.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

John and Lemonia Komis (the "Komises") owned 673.77 acres of
property outside Santa Fe. 4 On November 14, 1988, the City of Santa
Fe ("City") condemned 43.431 acres of that property in order to construct
a bypass road to transport hazardous nuclear waste from Los Alamos
to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant ("WIPP") site in Carlsbad, New
Mexico.5 The WIPP site and the bypass to that site were very controversial
6
topics at the time the Komises' land was condemned. The Komises
claimed that they were entitled to severance damages for the loss of
7
value to their remaining property around the bypass. Specifically, the
Komises claimed that public fear of the transportation of radioactive
waste reduced the property value of their uncondemned land."
Following a jury trial, the jury awarded the Komises $884,192.00 in
total compensation consisting of the following: (1) value of the land
taken in the amount of $489,582.50; (2) severance damages to the buffer
zone around the road in the amount of $60,794.50; and (3) severance
damages for perceived loss due to public perception in the amount of

1. 114 N.M. 659, 845 P.2d 753 (1992).
2. Id. at 661, 845 P.2d at 755.
3. Id. at 662, 845 P.2d at 756.
4. Id. at 661, 845 P.2d at 755.
5. Id.
6. "Three months before the taking, ninety-four articles, pictures and letters to the editor
appeared in the local media concerning the WIPP bypass or some aspect of it." Id. at 663, 845
P.2d at 757.
7. Id. at 661, 845 P.2d at 755.
8. Defendant-Appellee's Answer Brief at 3, City of Santa Fe v. Komis, 114 N.M. 659, 845
P.2d 753 (1992) (No. 20,325).
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$337,815.00. 9 The City appealed from the judgment originally filed, largely
on evidentiary grounds.' 0 Because this case raised an issue of first impression which was of substantial public importance, the parties were
granted a joint motion to transfer the appeal to the supreme court."
On appeal, the City asserted that property valuation based on public
fear should be compensable only where the fear is reasonable. 2 The
Komises, on the other hand, argued that property valuation based on
public fear should be compensable whether the fear is reasonable or
not.'3 The supreme court discussed three judicial approaches to property
valuation in partial condemnation cases 4 and adopted the most expansive
view, stating that "if [a] loss of value can be proven, it should be
compensable regardless of its source."" Accordingly, the court affirmed
the trial court's judgment on the valuation issue. 6
III.

BACKGROUND OF PROPERTY VALUATION IN PARTIAL
CONDEMNATION ACTIONS

The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 7 and Article II of the
New Mexico Constitution' 8 provide for "just compensation" for those
whose private property is taken for public use. An obvious taking occurs
when the Government condemns private property for its own use, but
a taking also occurs when a condemnation case causes a significant
diminution in the value of neighboring land. 9
Once a taking has occurred, the state or government must pay the
property owner the value of the property taken. In New Mexico, a person
whose land is condemned is entitled to the land's actual value as of the
date the condemnation petition is filed. 20 As for "property not taken
but injuriously affected," the value is determined according to its value
on the date the condemnation petition is filed and "the amount of the
award [is] determined from the evidence and [is not] limited to any

9. Komis, 114 N.M. at 661-62, 845 P.2d at 755-56.
10. Id. at 661, 845 P.2d at 755. The City argued under six points that reversible error was
committed by the trial court concerning the admission and exclusion of certain evidence. Id.; see
also discussion infra notes 61-85 and accompanying text.
11. Komis, 114 N.M. at 661, 845 P.2d at 755.
12. Petitioner-Appellant's Reply Brief at 1-2, City of Santa Fe v. Komis, 114 N.M. 659, 845
P.2d 753 (1992) (20,325).
13. Defendants-Appellees' Answer Brief at 2, City of Santa Fe. v. Komis, 114 N.M. 659, 845
P.2d 753 (1992) (20,325) arguing that this view is the "law of the case."
14. Komis, 114 N.M. at 662, 845 P.2d at 756.
15. Id. at 662, 845 P.2d at 756.
16. Id. at 663. 845 P.2d at 757. The trial court also modified the interest rate on the judgment
from six to eight percent. The City argued that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to modify
that interest rate, since the notice of appeal was on file when the modification was made. The
supreme court agreed with the City and reversed the lower court, remanding the issue for entry of
an appropriate order.
17. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
18. N.M. CONST. art. 11, § 20.
19. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
20. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-2-15(A) (1978).
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amount alleged in the petition or set forth in the answer. "21 The measurement of damages recoverable for a partial taking is the difference
between the fair market value of the entire property immediately before
the taking and the fair market value of the remaining property immediately
after the taking. 2 The value of property is determined by considering
not merely the uses to which it was put at the time of23 condemnation,
but the highest and best uses to which it could be put.
Relevant New Mexico statutes and jury instructions do not specifically
address whether a landowner is entitled to compensation for the diminution
in value to his remaining property caused by public fear of the use to
which the condemned property will be put.2 Therefore, the Komis court
was confronted with the following question: should the Komises be
awarded compensation for a diminution in value to their remaining
property, where the loss in value was caused by public perception or
fear of the use to which the bypass was to be put?21
In answering this question, the Komis court relied heavily on electromagnetic power line cases.2 All over the country, courts have struggled
with the question of whether compensation should be allowed to property
owners for the devaluation of their remaining land based on public fear
of electromagnetic fields. 27 Landowners have claimed that when a power
company condemns a portion of their land to put power lines over it,
the land surrounding the power lines is devalued because people are
afraid of the electromagnetic field surrounding the lines.n Prospective
purchasers are, therefore, less willing to purchase the remaining property
and the owners receive less money for the property than they would
have received before the condemnation occurred. 29 In resolving the fearbased valuation question, courts have taken one of three judicial approaches: the "majority rule," the "intermediate rule," or the "minority
rule. "30
Majority Rule
Under the majority rule, 3' which the Komis court adopted, impact on
market value caused by fear or public perception may be shown and

A.

21. Id.
JURY INSTRUCTON CIV. 13-704.
23. City of Albuquerque v. Chapman, 76 N.M. 162, 413 P.2d 204 (1966). In determining the
fair market value of the Komis property, the court determined that the highest and best use of
the land at the time it was condemned was speculative investment for subdivision into rural homesites
or for recreational purposes. Komis, 114 N.M. at 661, 845 P.2d at 755.
24. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42A-1-26 lists the types of special damages that may be recoverable in
a condemnation action. These damages may be recoverable in addition to the usual money damages.
See also N.M. UNIF. JURy INsTRUCON CIv. 13-705.
25. Komis, 114 N.M. at 661, 845 P.2d at 755.
26. Id. at 662, 845 P.2d at 756.
27. San Diego Gas and Elec. v. Daley, 253 Cal. Rptr. 144 (Ct. App. 1988); Willsey v. Kansas
City Power and Light Corp., 631 P.2d 268 (Kan. App. 1981); Zappavigna v. State of New York
and Power Auth. of the State of New York, 588 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1992).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Komis, 114 N.M. at 662, 845 P.2d at 756 (citing Willsey v. Kansas City Power & Light
Co., 631 P.2d 268 (Kan. App. 1981)).
31. At the present time, the following states have arguably adopted the majority rule: California,

22. N.M. UNIF.
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compensated without proving the reasonableness of the fear.3 2 The majority rule is typified by the case of San Diego Gas & Electric v. Daley,33
which the Komis court relied on, in part, in reviewing the trial court's
evidentiary rulings.3 4 In Daley, the San Diego Gas and Electric Co.
("SDG&E") condemned a 200-foot wide easement on the Daley property
in order to erect power lines over it." Judgment was awarded to Daley
based partially on the diminution in value to his remaining property
6
caused by the public's fear of electromagnetic radiation.1
On appeal, SGD&E claimed that Daley's experts were inappropriately
allowed to testify that they would discourage housing within 900 to 1000
feet of the easement because of the possibility of biological injury from
electromagnetic radiation. 37 The appellate court upheld admission of that
expert evidence because it helped establish that public perception of the
danger from electromagnetic radiation had a depressing effect on property
value.38 The expert testimony was not admitted to show that electromagnetic lines caused biological injury, because the court had already
declared that "the reasonableness of the alleged buyer fear [is] irrelevant
and [there will be] no testimony as to specific fears or as to the reasonableness of such fears." ' 39 The appellate court indicated that the
testimony was not improperly used by the jury because "[t]he jury award
. .. was not based upon any speculation that the electromagnetic fields
do in fact cause biological hazards to humans or animals." 4
The question for the Daley jury was not whether there was, in fact,
a danger posed by electromagnetic fields, but whether the buying public
believed that such a danger existed and whether such belief resulted in
the diminution of property values. 41 The Daley court held that severance
damages can "include damages associated with public fear of electromagnetic radiation from lines, at least to [the] extent that such fear [has
a] depressing effect on [the] market value of [the] adjoining property. ' 42
Under Daley, then, the only inquiry is whether a calculated diminution
of the present market value of the property has occurred as a result of
public fear.4 3 Thus, even if scientific studies conclusively prove that no
ill effects can occur from electromagnetic power lines, compensation is

Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, New York, South Dakota, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Virginia and Washington. Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Fear of Powerline, Gas or
Oil Pipeline, or Related Structure as Element of Damages in Easement Condemnation Proceeding,
23 A.L.R. 4th 631, 637-38 (1983).
32. Komis, 114 N.M. at 662, 845 P.2d at 756 (citing Hicks v. United States ex rel. TVA, 266
F.2d 515, 521 (6th Cir. 1959)).
33. San Diego Gas and Elec. v. Daley, 253 Cal. Rptr. 144 (Ct. App. 1988).
34. See Komis, 114 N.M. at 666, 845 P.2d at 760, concerning the court's refusal to allow
evidence about the testing and safety features of WIPP's transportation system.
35. Daley, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
36. Id. at 144.
37. Id. at 145.
38. Id. at 153.
39. Id. at 146.
40. Id. at 151.
41. See id. at 146.
42. Id. at 144.
43. Id. at 151.
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still allowed for diminution in property value if it can be shown that a
popular fear of power lines depresses the property's value.
Intermediate Rule
Under the intermediate rule, compensation is allowed to property owners
for diminution in the value of their remaining land caused by fear or
public perception, if that fear is reasonably based." This slightly stricter45
position is represented by Dunlap v. Loup River Public Power District,
another power line case. The jury was instructed that it could award
damages for depreciation in market value based on public fear if that
fear was "reasonable, not speculative nor ill-defined, but founded on
practical experience."46 The Dunlap court went on to adopt a stringent
definition of "reasonable":

B.

Mere general fears from the presence of a transmission line cannot
be made the basis upon which to predicate any depreciation in the
market value, for ill-defined fear that at some unknown time in the
future some misfortune may come to man or beast by reason of the
transmission line cannot enter into the consideration of those who
are required to fix the amount of the damages. But, on the other
hand, if such fears be reasonable, not speculative nor ill-defined, but
founded on practical experience, and if such fears are entertained so
generally as to enter into the calculations of all who proposed to buy
or sell, can it logically be said that they do not depreciate the market
value of 'property?4 7
The Dunlap court did not require proof positive that electromagnetic
power lines were dangerous, but it did require the jury to look at whether
the fear of electromagnetic power lines was reasonable and widespread."
At least one annotation has cited Dunlap for the proposition that conjectural property value fears are noncompensable unless those fears are
exactly how to determine
reasonable, ' 9 but Dunlap does not indicate
0
not
or
"reasonable"
are
fears
whether
Thereafter, in Willsey v. Kansas City Power,5' the court set out standards for determining which fears are "reasonable" by applying a threepart test:
[f]ear in the minds of the buying public on the date of taking is
relevant to the proof of damages when the following elements appear:

44. See Komis, 114 N.M. at 662, 845 P.2d at 756. At the present time, the following states
have arguably adopted the "intermediate" rule: Arkansas, Connecticut, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Jersey, Tennessee, Texas and Utah. See Gulbis, supra note 32.
45. Dunlap v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 284 N.W. 742 (Neb. 1939), cited by Komis, 114
N.M. at 662, 845 P.2d at 756.
46. Dunlap, 284 N.W. at 745.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See Gulbis, supra note 32, at 651.
50. See id.
51. Willsey v. Kansas City Power, 631 P.2d 268 (Kan. App. 1981).
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(1) That there is a basis in reason or experience for the fear; (2)
That such fear enters into the calculations of persons who deal in
the buying and selling of similar property and (3) depreciation of
market value [occurs] because of the existence of such fear. 2

In Willsey, the court looked at proposed evidence to see if it helped
establish a "reasonable" fear of electromagnetic power lines." Applying
the three Heddin factors, the Willsey court determined that expert valuation testimony linking market value to the public's fear of high voltage
lines was admissible because (1) there was a basis in reason for the fear,
since the utility companies themselves ran ad campaigns warning of the
dangers of electromagnetic lines; (2) the real estate appraiser testified
that buyers in the marketplace fear power lines; and, (3) such fear affected
the market value of the property.5 4 Therefore, the evidence was relevant
to the main inquiry: whether the public's fear of electromagnetic lines
was "reasonable" or not."
C.

Minority Rule

Under the strictest "minority rule," public fear is never a valid basis
for property valuation in condemnation cases, even if that fear affects
the market value of the land.5 6 This judicial approach is typified by the
1914 case of Alabama Power Co. v. Keystone Lime Co. which also
concerns public fear of powerlines.17 The court acknowledged the danger
inherent in powerlines when it said "[tihe cables of appellant are, it is
true, so heavily charged with electricity that, if a human being comes
in contact with or within 2 or 3 feet of them while they are charged

with electricity, death will be the result.""
discount the public's fear of those lines:

The court then went on to

52. The court indicated that the landowner had to show either an actual danger forming the
basis of the fear or that the fear was reasonable. Heddin v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Co., 522 S.W.2d
886, 888 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
53. Willsey, 631 P.2d at 278.
54. Id. at 279.
55. The admission or exclusion of evidence in a jurisdiction which has adopted the intermediate
approach can be confusing. If the highest state court has set out standards against which to measure
the evidence, as was done in Willsey, the trier of fact will be greatly aided in reaching a result.
If the court has not set out explicit standards, as was the case in Dunlap, the trier of fact will
be left to its own devices in deciding whether the fear is "reasonable" or not. This, of course,
will never be an issue in a jurisdiction which has adopted the majority view, since the "reasonableness"
of the public fear is not a factor to be considered.
56. There are few states which still adhere to the minority position: at the present time, those
states are Alabama, Illinois and West Virginia. See Gulbis, supra note 32.
57. Alabama Power Co. v. Keystone Lime Co., 67 So. 833 (Ala. 1914), cited by Komis, 114
N.M. at 662, 845 P.2d at 756.
58. Alabama Power Co., 67 So. at 835. An implicit theme of the court's decision was the desire
to encourage the spread of electricity across the country or at least to not discourage electric
companies from expanding their services because they have to pay large condemnation costs. Courts
may be moving toward the intermediate and majority views in power line cases because electricity
is firmly ensconced in our daily lives and probably will not be dislodged by large condemnation
awards. See Alabama Power Co., 67 So. at 837. Interestingly, applying that analogy to nuclear
power plants, courts have shown far less inclination to shield nuclear generation companies from
liability based on fear-based property valuation. See Komis, 114 N.M. 659, 845 P.2d 753 (1992);
Texas Elec. Serv. Co. v. Ragle, 559 S.W. 2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Texas Elec. Serv. Co. v.
West, 560 S.W. 2d 769 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), reh'g denied (1978).
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If it be true that some people who have not grown accustomed to
lines similar to that of appellant are afraid of this improvement, and
that therefore they are not now willing to buy appellee's lands, the
law can furnish to appellee no remedy therefor, and cannot regard
depreciation created by such a cause as resting upon any substantial
basis .... In allowing compensation, however, it cannot allow any
compensation on account of any claimed depreciation of such remaining land which is due to the mere fears of some of the people,
which are founded in reality upon their lack of knowledge of the
real effect of the line, and which human experience shows is not
justified by the facts.5 9
The minority rule has few evidentiary problems, since the trier of fact
is not allowed to consider fear as a reasonable basis for compensation.
IV.

KOMIS AND THE FUTURE OF FEAR-BASED PROPERTY
VALUE IN NEW MEXICO CONDEMNATION CASES

Evidentiary Rulings in Komis Under the Majority Rule

A.

After reviewing the three judicial approaches to the fear-based valuation
issue, the supreme court in Komis chose to follow the majority rule: a
loss of value that can be proven should be compensable, regardless of

its source.6 When the Komis court adopted the majority view, it specifically stated:
Our objective in a condemnation case is to compensate the landowner
for damages actually suffered .... Thus, if people will not purchase
property because they fear living or working on or near a WIPP
route, or if a buyer can be found, but only at a reduced price, a
loss of value exists. If this61 loss can be proven to the jury, the landowner
should be compensated.
Having made that decision, the court went on to consider the evidentiary
issues raised in the context of the majority rule. In deciding on a standard
of review, the court observed that "[a] trial court abuses its discretion
when the movant can demonstrate that the court's rulings were clearly
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the
court.' '62 Using the deferential abuse standard, the court did not reverse
any of the trial court's evidentiary rulings. The rulings made by the court
are illustrative of the types of evidence which will be admissible and
inadmissible in future New Mexico condemnation cases where fear-based
property valuation is an issue.

59.
60.
61.
62.

Alabama Power Co., 67 So. at 833.
Komis, 114 N.M. at 662, 845 P.2d at 756.
Id. at 662-63, 845 P.2d at 756-57.
Id. at 663, 845 P.2d at 757.
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1. The Public Opinion Survey
The court upheld the admission of a public-opinion survey despite an
objection to its prejudicial nature. 6 1 Of the residents of Santa Fe county
who were polled, 930/a were familiar with the WIPP property and 830
were familiar with the proposed bypass; additionally, 410 believed that
residential property near the bypass would sell for between 110%a and
30% less than comparable property not in proximity to the bypass. 4 The
supreme court reasoned that the poll results effectively demonstrated
buyer fear of the transportation of nuclear waste and the effect of that
fear on market value.6 5 Such evidence is relevant to prove that fear exists
and that the fear affects the property's market value, as is required under
the majority rule.
2. Expert Testimony Relying on The Public Opinion Survey
The Komises called an expert appraiser to testify to the diminished
property value of their remaining land." The expert said that the WIPP
route affected the value of the land around the bypass and he based his
opinion, in part, on the results of the public opinion poll. 67 The City
objected to the admission of that evidence, contending that the poll results
were questionable and were not a valid basis for the expert's opinion."
However, the supreme court held that a qualified expert witness could
look to a non-expert source to corroborate or provide a foundation for
his opinion." Therefore, even though the poll was not conclusive proof
of fear-based loss of value, the expert could partially rely on it in arriving
70
at his conclusion that a fear-based diminution in value did occur.
3. The Videotape
The jury was allowed to view a videotape entitled "The WIPP Trail,
7
a Nation's Crisis Dumped on New Mexico" before reaching its decision .
That videotape was produced by Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety
and was portrayed by the City as an "unabashed rally against the WIPP
project." ' 72 The videotape was narrated by Robert Redford, whose "perfectly modulated voice" lent "credibility and appeal to the alarmist
arguments posed by the various speakers." 73 The City argued that the

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 663, 845 P.2d at 757.
66. Id. at 664, 845 P.2d at 758.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. Id.
72. Petitioner-Appellant's Brief-in-Chief at 13, City of Santa Fe v. Komis, 114 N.M. 659, 845
P.2d 753 (1992) (No. 20,325).
73. Id. at 14.
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videotape should not have been admitted because
its probative value was
74
greatly outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
The supreme court indicated that the videotape was evidence of the
information the public relied on to formulate its perception that the land
surrounding the bypass was devalued.7 5 In addition, the videotape was
relevant because the Komises' expert appraiser relied on it to formulate
76
his opinions regarding the effect of public perception on value.
4. Testing and Safety Features of WIPP Transportation System
At trial, the City sought to introduce evidence concerning the safety
and testing features of the WIPP transportation system. 77 The City wanted
to balance the prejudicial effect of the videotape by introducing testimony
concerning the types of radioactive material to be transported, the number
of shipments anticipated on a yearly and weekly basis, the safety program
and screening process for the selection of drivers and the types of
78
containers the nuclear waste would be stored in.
The trial court excluded that evidence, as well as any testimony con79
cerning the probability of a nuclear accident along the bypass route.
The supreme court upheld the exclusion of that evidence, since the safety
or danger of the WIPP transportation system relates to the reasonableness
of the public's perception and is not relevant under the majority view.80
In a court which has adopted the majority view, the reasonableness of
the public fear is not relevant to the inquiry.
5. Study of Comparable Property Values
At trial, the City also sought to introduce a five-year study of property
values along St. Francis Drive.8 ' The study showed that property values
were increasing along St. Francis Drive, even though it was being used
to transport radioactive materials to Los Alamos Laboratories.8 2 The trial
court excluded the study as irrelevant. 83
The supreme court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in excluding the study, since the study did not show whether buyers and
sellers knew that hazardous waste was being transported along St. Francis
Drive.8 4 The study also did not show whether public perception had an
effect on the prices along St. Francis Drive, and it made no attempt to

74. Id. at 664, 845 P.2d at 758 (citing N.M. R. EvID. 11-403).
75. Id. at 665, 845 P.2d at 759.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 666, 845 P.2d at 760.
78. Petitioner-Appellant's Brief-in-Chief at 16, City of Santa Fe v. Komis, 114 N.M. 659,.845
P.2d 753 (1992) (No. 20,325).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Komis, 114 N.M. at 666, 84-5 P.2d at 760.
82. Id.
83. Defendants-Appellee's Answer Brief at 20, City of Santa Fe v. Komis, 114 N.M 659, 845
P.2d 753 (1992) (No 20,325) (citing N.M. R. EviD. 11-401).
84. Komis, 114 N.M. at 666, 845 P.2d at 760.
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compare the St. Francis property to the Komises' property. 85 Overall,
the issues addressed by the study did not match closely enough the
majority view inquiry into whether a loss of value to the Komis property
had occurred because of fear of the use to which the adjacent property
was to be put.
In evaluating each piece of evidence, the court used the same yardstick:
did the evidence help determine whether a fear-based diminution in value
to the Komises' remaining property had occurred because of the WIPP
bypass? If the evidence was useful in answering that question, it was
admissible.
B.

Conclusion
The Komis decision set out ground rules for a new type of compensable
damage in New Mexico condemnation cases. If a loss in value to remaining
property is caused by public fear of the use to which the condemned
property will be put, that loss should be compensable.8 6 That holding
will allow greater compensation to landowners whose remaining property
is devalued by a condemnation and will encourage those landowners to
find new and novel ways of proving their loss to a jury or judge.
The Komis ruling permits the admission of evidence showing the existence of public fear, but not evidence concerning the reasonableness of
the fear. Evidence concerning property valuation will be admitted if it
aids in determining the "fair market value" of the remaining property
or it helps the court or jury determine whether a fear-based diminution
in value has, in fact occurred.
After Komis, condemning authorities will be confronted with a choice:
whether to spend advertising dollars to improve the public's attitude
toward their projects or to spend money on damage awards to landowners
whose remaining property has been devalued by public perception or
fear.
PEGGI A. WHITMORE

85. Id. at 666, 845 P.2d at 760.
86. Id. at 662, 845 P.2d at 756.

